

Statement on EAST TIMOR
to the UN Committee of 24

August 1986



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tapol

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T A P O L S u b m i s s i o n
t o t h e U N

On 15 August, 1986, TAPOL was one of a record 21 non-governmental organisations which petitioned the UN Decolonisation Committee on the question of East Timor's right to self-determination. The full text of this Submission is reproduced here. The four appended documents are not included; all were taken from material already published in TAPOL Bulletin.

September 1986

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Statement on the question of East Timor

to the UN Committee of 24, August 1986

by

TAPOL, the British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners
and Human Rights in Indonesia

Mr Chairman,

My name is Liem Soei Liong. I was born and grew up in Indonesia and I am now living in the Netherlands. I am grateful to the Committee of 24 for this opportunity to present the concerns of TAPOL, an organisation which has been campaigning since 1975 against the violent and persistent abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian forces of occupation in East Timor. TAPOL firmly supports East Timor's right to self-determination and urges the UN to take measures to ensure that the people of East Timor are allowed freely to exercise that right.

Last month, on 17th July, the Indonesian Government celebrated the tenth anniversary of its illegal and brutal annexation of East Timor in 1976. It was on that day ten years ago that General Suharto, the Indonesian president, signed the Bill of Integration. He thought that, by calling it 'integration', the world would be deceived into accepting Indonesia's illegal seizure of this territory as a legitimate act, carried out with the consent of the people.

'Integration' is a cover-up for invasion. After years of pretending that no invasion took place, the Indonesian government has now publicly admitted that its troops did invade East Timor. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, has recently declared - and I quote his words from the Indonesian Observer, 17 July 1986 - that

"the idea of a leftist enclave at the eastern tip of the Nusa Tenggara archipelago which Jakarta was certain the Fretilin would establish, called for intervention. On December 7, 1975, the Indonesian Army landed at Dili. The guerrilla war that followed involved 30,000 soldiers. Thousands of lives were lost on both sides."

Mr Chairman,

Hardly any foreign visitors bothered to attend the tenth anniversary celebration in Dili, while foreign journalists were not even invited to attend. The lack of international interest helps explain President Suharto's decision not to attend either, but to send instead his Foreign Minister,

Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, and his acting minister of the Interior, General Sudharmono. The other top-level figure who failed to appear was General Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and architect of the 1975 invasion. By staying away, General Murdani thought he could conceal the fact that East Timor is under military control. It reminds us of the way tanks, armoured cars and weapons of war are hidden from view whenever foreigners are escorted on trips through the territory.

Mr Chairman,

The Indonesian military government faces major problems at present, precipitated by the drastic fall in the price of oil, the mounting criticism of its inhumane transmigration programme, the persistent revelations of corruption by the Suharto family and cronies, and misgivings about Suharto's determination to remain in office for yet another 5-year term from 1988. But these issues should not distract attention from Indonesia's most heinous crime, its colonial war against the people of East Timor. Far from being true to the tradition of anti-colonialism inspiring many Third World countries, Indonesia has become a colonising power, bringing shame to the principles established in Bandung 31 years ago.

Mr Chairman,

The Indonesian government frequently condemns the excesses or neglect of Portuguese colonialism in East Timor. The tenth anniversary of annexation was again an occasion for Foreign Minister Mochtar to malign Portugal. But we should never forget that all the enslavement and oppression the East Timorese suffered during more than four centuries of Portuguese colonisation pales into insignificance as compared to the devastation and suffering inflicted during a decade of Indonesian colonisation and war.

Where Indonesian military control has been able to assert itself in East Timor, the hallmarks and features of a colonised territory are striking. In the cities of Dili and Baucau where most of the 50,000 Indonesians now in East Timor are to be found, a drastic transformation is taking place. They are becoming Javanese towns, inhabited primarily by Indonesian military personnel and bureaucrats, together with their families.

Mr Chairman,

There are two faces to the Indonesian colonial regime in East Timor. One is the public face, a cosmetic image to persuade the world that Indonesia has improved the welfare of the people and that it rules with their consent. This face is adorned with a civil administration, flushed with development funds from Jakarta, busily building roads, schools and

hospitals. The administration is run by an affable and well-educated East Timorese, Governor Mario Carrascalao who has assumed the habits and style of Indonesian bureaucrats in his dress, mannerisms and ideology. The other is the grim face of military domination, the reality of everyday life which the Timorese are forced to confront night and day. I would like to deal with these two faces of Indonesian colonialism in East Timor.

Mr Chairman,

Indonesia's "27th province" is a military project run by the Armed Forces. This is clear from the fact that the territory falls under the responsibility of a special, centralised military command, the *Komando Operasi Keamanan Timor Timur*, or Security Operations Command of East Timor, abbreviated to *Kopskam Timor Timur*. This special command is commanded by Brigadier-General Warsito who is concurrently commander of the First Infantry Division of KOSTRAD, the Army's Special Strategic Command. This is one of two divisions that make up KOSTRAD which, in the course of the re-organisation of the army that started in 1983, has at its disposal the complete range of military forces - infantry, tanks, strike-force troops, rapid-deployment forces, as well as a whole range of sea and air support. The commander of this KOSTRAD Division has been described as occupying "the most prestigious position" in the army, after the Army chief-of-staff. [Sinar Harapan, 3 October 1985]

The decision to create *Kopskam Timor Timur* is a measure of the importance the Indonesian Armed Forces attaches to the conduct of its continuing war against the people of East Timor. The combination of these two commander positions is not a coincidence. The previous commander of *Kopskam Timor Timur*, Major-General (then Brigadier-General) Soegito, also held the two posts concurrently, before he was appointed commander of the Jakarta Military Command in August last year.

While *Kopskam Timor Timur* is in charge of the conduct of the war, the territorial management of East Timor is the responsibility of KOREM 164 Wira Dharma, the Sub-Regional Military Command. Sub-regional military commands exist throughout Indonesia, and are subordinated to regional military commands which are known as Kodam. It is only in East Timor that there are two lines of command for the local Korem, up to KODAM Udayana in Bali and up to the war command in Jakarta.

It is estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 troops are usually present in East Timor. The number of Korem 164 troops remains fairly constant, for they are engaged primarily in keeping order in the re-settlements, the *pemukiman*, where the vast majority of Timorese have been forced to live. It is the number of special troops, brought in as required

by the level of war activities, the season, and so on, that tends to vary from time to time.

There is a constant flow of army battalions replacing each other, from different parts of Indonesia, for operational duties. The most notorious of these operational troops are the red-beret, KOPASSUS para-commandos who intimidate and terrorise the people, launch special intelligence sweeps and have their own interrogation and detention centres. Kopassus troops are known to the East Timorese as 'nanggala'. Whatever that term may mean in its original sanskrit, to the Timorese it means knife-wielding killers. Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, appointed last December as Korem 164 commander, is a red-beret nanggala who has served in East Timor, on and off, for many years.

There can be few Indonesian soldiers who have not seen active service in East Timor. It is here that Indonesian troops get their war practice. Many Indonesian officers have risen fast in rank over the corpses of the Timorese. Colonel Yunus Yosfiah recently boasted that his greatest achievement was to kill Nicolau Lobato, the president of Fretilin, in December 1978. He has publicly admitted that this greatly boosted his career.

Indeed, virtually all the new generation of officers now installed in the highest echelons of the Indonesian armed forces are East Timor war veterans, who won their battle honours fighting against the armed resistance in East Timor and the against defenceless East Timorese living under Indonesian rule.

Mr Chairman,

The centralised military structure of Kopskam Timur Timor explains why East Timor has been given "special status". The "27th province" is not administered as a province at all but is subject to methods of administration determined by the conduct of war operations and the current level of security "disorders". Naturally, men like Governor Carrascalao who have been chosen by Jakarta to run this make-believe "provincial" administration, are not at all happy about "special status". He recently called for an end to "special status" [see Kompas, 17 July 1986], complaining that it renders him powerless and without authority. Not surprisingly, the idea was quickly rebuffed by the government in Jakarta.

Mr Chairman,

You are certainly familiar with the network of resettlements or pemukiman, into which the majority of East Timorese have been herded, To the Timorese, they are nothing less than concentration camps. For your information, I have attached to my submission several documents produced by

TAPOL on conditions in these camps, including maps of camp locations recently received from the resistance in East Timor.

These pemukiman conform with the army's basic doctrine of territorial management, which requires people to live in communities that lend themselves to effective military and bureaucratic control, and denies them the right to preserve their traditional life-styles in mountainous, remote communities, or wherever else they wish to live. Resettlement is a feature of social control in many parts of Indonesia. In East Timor, it has been enforced in particularly vicious and brutal fashion, preceded by years of war that decimated the population and compelled mountain dwellers to abandon the interior, stricken by hunger and disease that resulted from Indonesian military operations in the 1970s. The rigid control over freedom of movement and travel in East Timor far exceeds anything anywhere in Indonesia. This is Indonesia's particular brand of apartheid, where the original inhabitants have been re-settled in areas of separate development.

Mr Chairman,

Let us turn for a moment to Governor Carrascaloo's civil administration. While the "27th province" has a high-profile governor, it is in effect run by a bureaucracy composed of senior civil servants brought in from outside, mainly from Java. Since East Timor is classified as a "hardship" post, civil servants who get appointments in East Timor receive a 95 per cent bonus plus the incentive of a two-rung jump in grading.

The normal provincial structure down to village level is almost non-existent, as local administration and other social activities such as education, the information service, the offices of religion, and so on, are run largely by the army. At the provincial level, most economic and social programmes, in particular, the development activities now being undertaken to "upgrade" East Timor's economy, are in the hands of a bureaucracy controlled vertically by government departments in Jakarta.

Take for example, the agricultural service. The head of the East Timor office of the Department of Agriculture is Ir Hadiono, a Javanese with ambitious plans for a colonial-style development of East Timor as a plantation economy. He dreams of East Timor becoming a "cottage-garden" where 15 per cent of the land will be used to produce vegetables, 9 per cent for pasturing, 10 per cent for tree-crop plantations, 24 per cent for commercial forests, 10 per cent for irrigated rice and the remainder for urban development.

For these purposes, a number of 'desa potensial' or 'model villages' have been created, linked with irrigated rice projects and plantations, and inhabited primarily by settlers or transmigrants from Bali or Java, as well

as so-called "translocals", that is to say, Timorese from other parts of East Timor. Hadiono says that \$300,000 will be invested in every village, each with a population of around one thousand people. According to official figures, one hundred of these villages should have been set up by 1986, with another 123 planned for 1986/87. These plans are way behind schedule, however, partly for lack of funds but primarily because so much of the territory is still not under Indonesian control.

But the military strategists are interested in molding a very different type of village, suited specifically to the requirements of territorial management. These are the *desa pembangunan* or 'development villages' which, in the words of Brigadier-General Warsito, will function as *titik-titik kuat perlawanan rakyat* or 'fortresses of people's resistance'. The term *perlawanan rakyat* (people's resistance) is integral to the army's doctrine of *Hankamrata* or 'total people's defence and security'. This means mobilising villagers to fight against anyone who opposes the government or resists Indonesian rule.

Under the *Hankamrata* strategy, the army guides and leads the population in all aspects of life. The war situation in East Timor necessitates the application of this doctrine in its most extreme form. With resistance still so widespread in East Timor, General Warsito's 'development villages' are bound to receive much greater emphasis than Hadiono's 'model villages'.

In implementation of the Warsito strategy, Korem commander, Colonel Yunus has ordered all district military commanders down to village level to set up 'model gardens' to "teach" the Timorese how to cultivate the soil. Such a preposterous concept only exposes the arrogance of Indonesian contempt for Timorese peasants who for centuries sustained a viable, subsistence economy. Colonel Yunus says that five hundred military-run 'model gardens' have already been created "to help improve the living conditions of the people". This strategy reveals on the one hand an attempt by the occupation forces to impose greater control over productive activities in the concentration camps, while indicating that food shortages are indeed serious. Colonel Yunus claims that these 'model gardens' will improve living conditions and induce people to "resist the temptation" of supporting resistance to Indonesian rule. In other words, the 'development village' strategy is aimed at alienating the people from the guerrilla movement.

Another objective of the *Hankamrata* strategy is to incite Timorese to spy on and eliminate their own relatives. Indonesian journalists who recently visited East Timor, reported Brigadier-General Warsito as being confident that security prospects are now excellent. Why? Because Timorese are ready to murder their closest kin on Indonesia's behalf. He told

journalists about a Timorese woman who, he claims, killed her husband when she discovered that he supported Fretilin, and described an incident in which a man shot his younger brother dead after failing to persuade him to abandon the guerrillas. To find comparable examples of politically-motivated fratricide, one would need to go back to the experiences of the German people during the Hitler era.

Mr Chairman,

My final testimony concerns one of the ugliest features of Indonesian colonialism, its racism and its contempt for all aspects of Timorese culture. Timorese farming traditions are consistently disparaged as being backward and in need of "improvement" by the adoption of Javanese farming methods. In pursuit of the obliteration of Timor's 'inferior' culture and languages, Bahasa Indonesia has been made compulsory in schools and offices, while native languages like Tetum, Macasaino, Mambai or Tokodede are being marginalised and eliminated, wherever Indonesians can impose their control over Timorese communities. The superiority of the Indonesian language has been one of the main themes of the tenth anniversary 'celebrations'. "By mastering the Indonesian language," wrote one Jakarta daily on 17 July, "they (the East Timorese) have been ushered into a new world that enables them to experience some meaningful change in the quality of their lives." The Portuguese colonialists, in their day, could hardly have formulated more clearly the standard colonial belief in the superiority of their own language and culture.

Mr Chairman,

It is the duty of international bodies like the United Nations to denounce all forms of colonialism in this modern era, and in this particular case, to denounce Indonesian colonialism in East Timor. It is the task of the international community to demand the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East Timor, opening the way for the Maubere people freely to decide their own future in a genuine act of self-determination, supervised by the United Nations.

Thank you for your attention.

New York, 15 August 1986

TAPOL

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